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LIVING CONSTITUTIONS*
BY GRAY L. DORSEYt
A French poet once ranked the arts according to the intractability
of the media, rating sculpture highest. By this standard, constitution-
making is the highest of all arts because its medium, more stubborn
than marble, is what William Faulkner has called the "simple, incor-
rigible, intractable, invincible human heart."'
Simple enough to write a constitution. But what makes it live?
How is the structure of cooperation it delineates to be impressed upon
the intractable human heart? This a matter of moment to millions.
C. L. Sulzberger, writing from Saigon on March 11 of this year, said:
Communism must be kept out of South Vietnam. It would be
morally unforgivable to permit it once more to engulf the hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees who have already sacrificed every-
thing to flee it. Yet much remains to be done in erecting a barrier
of safety. . . . Feudalism must be abolished. Government must
be extended to the villages where all too often anarchy or com-
munism obtains. Not only the habit of independence but its in-
cumbent responsibilities must be acquired by the Vietnamese
people.
What exists in South Vietnam is a barren dictatorship-barren
because there is no effective dictator. Ngo Dinh Diem doesn't
dare install real political freedom because anarchic centrifugal
forces would rip the state apart. Yet this leaves everything in a
condition of moral paralysis. One cannot counter the mystique
of communism with unborn democracy and ineffective dictator-
ship.2
This problem, of what it is that quickens a social blueprint into a
society, is an intellectual puzzle I have worked at for nine years. I
believe the last piece has fallen into place. The present article con-
sists of the first once-over view of the result.
The problem first occupied my mind because it is the greatest
obstacle to effective international law. The community of Christian,
European states no longer controls the earth. Modern international
law was born in that community and functioned relatively well in it
for nearly three centuries. But we are in a new world, and the new
* Parts of this article appeared substantially in a thesis entitled "Law and
World Peace," submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the J.S.D.
degree, Yale Law School, and on file in Yale Law School library. Basic research
was made possible by a fellowship from the American Council of Learned So-
cieties during 1948-50. The author wishes to thank his colleague, Prof. Frank W.Miller, who read the manuscript, for constructive suggestions. Responsibility for
views expressed, however, is solely the author's.
t Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.1. Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, March 25, 1955, p. 22, col. 6.
2. N.Y. Times, March 12, 1955, p. 18c, col. 5.
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international community is one of diverse values, customs, and tradi-
tions.
Making international law effective seemed to me to depend upon
discovering the secret of human cooperation. Why do large numbers
of persons, or groups of persons, work together rather than at cross
purposes? Aristotle had asserted that family, village, and state are
"natural" associations and that "man is by nature a political animal."3
Do particular modes of human cooperation result necessarily from
some physiological or environmental factor? Or is it the case, rather,
that men are under a natural necessity to cooperate but that the par-
ticular mode of cooperation is selected by men through some faculty
not subject to cause-and-effect determinism? My working hypothesis
was that men can control the structure of cooperation; otherwise
conscious efforts to bring peace and order in the world are vain. I
thought it would be conclusive if I could show that the structure of
even the most necessary and elementary human associations, such as
the family, were determined by the conscious calculations of men.
Accordingly, I attempted a comparison between the cultural concep-
tions and the structure of social groups in early Greece and early
China.4 At the end of a year it was plain that this chronological ap-
proach was a lifetime's work, and I was compelled to lay it aside
temporarily in favor of an analytical approach. 5 Jurisprudence
seemed the logical place to begin.
JURISPRUDENCE EXAMINED FOR AN ANSWER TO THE
QUESTION: "WHAT MAKES CONSTITUTIONS LIVE?"
Early writers on jurisprudence were of the opinion that reason,
implanted in man by nature, decides the particular structure and
function of social associations. Aristotle himself said "the law is
reason unaffected by desire."6 Cicero said:
[L]aw is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which com-
mands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This rea-
son, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is
Law. [And again,] . . . what is more divine, I will not say in
man only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason,
when it is full grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom.
Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since
it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of
man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common
3. ARISTOTLE, POLrrIcs bk. I 2, 8-16 (Jowett transl. 1945).
4. The results of this study are in mimeographed comparative law materials.
A forerunner is Dorsey, Two Objective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order, in
IDEoLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 442 (Northrop ed. 1949).
5. The first results of this study are DoRSEY, LAW AND WORLD PEACE (un-
published manuscript in Yale Law School Library, 1950), submitted in partialfulfillment of requirements for J.S.D. degree, Yale Law School. A revision of the
same is mimeographed for use as international law material.
6. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III 16, 5 (Jowett transl. 1945).
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must also have right reason in common. And since right reason
is Law, we must believe that men have Law also in common with
the gods.7
According to this early conception, the universe is characterized
by an immutable rational order, knowable by men, who are rational
creatures. As they learn to know this order, they can work together
to meet their common needs. They can not live and work together if
they have not reason-and indeed are not even to be considered men.
Aristotle states that "[T] he state is a creation of nature, and.., man
is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere
accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it. ... "I
The conception that reason is the basis of cooperation among men
was held for many centuries. The Church, and kings by divine right,
exercised final authority in deciding what the rational order in the
universe required in the behavior of men. They were the casuists
(not in the derogatory sense).
The mores of the people, the just modes of intercourse among them,
could not be devised by themselves to suit their own opinions of con-
venience or efficiency. The relations among men must accord with
the immutable (divine) order in the universe. In Sir John Fortescue's
Commendation of the Laws of England, published about 1537, the
Chancellor exhorts the Prince, whose instruction has been entrusted
to him, to study the law, saying Moses had commanded the kings of
Israel to study Deuteronomy. "[B]ut the Law," the Prince replies,
"to the study and understanding whereof you now invite me, is merely
human, derived from human authority, and respects this world.... "D
On the contrary, the Chancellor answers:
[B] e pleased to know then, that not only the Deuteronomical,
but also all human laws are sacred; the definition of a law being
thus, "It is an holy sanction, "commanding whatever is honest,
and forbidding the contrary...."
Whence we, who are the ministerial officers, who sit and pre-
side in the Courts of Justice, are therefore not improperly called,
Sacerdotes (Priests). The import of the latin word (Sacerdos)
being one who gives or teaches holy things; and such are all laws
which are solemnly enacted and promulgated, though made by
men: seeing the Apostle says, (Rom. xiii. I.) that all power is
from God.' 0
By the casuistry of logic and authority, the Church and divine-right
kings (and in England, common-law courts) brought general moral
principles to bear upon the problems of daily intercourse, and laid
down the pattern of cooperation among the people. These general
7. CicERo, DE LEGmus bk. I vi, 19; bk. I vii, 23 (Keyes transl. 1928).
8. AISTOTLE, PoLiTICS bk. I 2, 9 (Jowett transl. 1945).
9. FORTESCUE, COMIMENDATION OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 4 (Grigor transl.
1917).
10. Id. at 5.
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moral principles were, in turn, largely derived from natural phi-
losophy, as is shown by the well-known dependence of Augustinian
orthodoxy upon Plato and of Thomistic orthodoxy upon Aristotle.
With the Renaissance and the Reformation men began a complete
re-examination, in the new scientific attitude of the age, of the
grounds of human action and of the bases of human cooperation.
Unfortunately, contemporary developments in philosophy led to the
severing of all connection between natural philosophy and the develop-
ing new social disciplines.-1
When the estrangement from natural philosophy occurred, all
objective criteria by which validity of general principles could be
judged were gone. All that remained-as shown in the analytical
jurisprudence of Austin-was the logic by which particular rules
were deduced from general principles. Holmes cut this down with a
stroke of the pen: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. ''12
But there are so many kinds of experience (as, of course, Holmes
well knew). There is the experience of what the court actually does,
what action it takes in a specific case, as distinguished from what it
says about the case in relation to established rules of law. This kind
of experience can be examined as a clue to whether the formal prop-
ositions of the decisions are out of touch with the reality of court
action." Then there is the subjective experience of the judge in reach-
ing a decision. Perhaps there are ways to probe this experience to
see what did in fact lead to the judge's decision-whether the logical
propositions in the statutes, reports, and lawyers' briefs, or some
predispositions, or beliefs, or communal experience. 14 There is the
experience of the effect the decision or the action of the court has upon
the relations of persons in the community-upon the subsequent be-
havior of the parties directly affected by the court's action, or upon
the behavior of persons in relationships similar to that before the
court. 5
There is the experience that persons have various competing de-
mands not all of which can be satisfied, and which the law more or
less successfully reconciles or balances." There is the experience of
11. See Dorsey, The State, Communism, and International Law, 1955 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 1-3.
12. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
13. As illustrative of the Legal Realist movement, see: LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); CLARK & SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISTRATION
IN CONNECTICUT (1937).
14. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1931).
15. Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control,
53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-the Next Step,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930).
16. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 IARv.
L. REv. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REv. 140, 489 (1911-12); Pound, The End
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personal psychological reaction to actions which legal decisions will
stamp as just or unjust. 7 And there is the personal psychological
experience of "belonging" to a group and feeling loyalty to political
and legal institutions.18
There is the experience that individuals achieve their ends through
cooperative action with others according to modes of behavior which
they commonly accept and follow in their day to day intercourse,
independently of any law process. And there is the experience that
legal prescriptions that depart too far from these patterns of coopera-
tion will be ignored or avoided whenever possible.19 The study of
experience can be given increased dimensions by extension backward
through time,20 or by focusing on the more simple context of a con-
temporary primitive society.21
However, there is also the experience of experiencing and acting
on the basis of experience. The human animal is capable of acting
because he will, not because he must. His activities are intentional
and he lives in an intentional community. 22 There is the experience
that the institutions which men form in the course of their coopera-
tion with each other also have a conscious purpose, an intentionality.1
Alexander H. Pekelis participated in the eye-opening work of legal
realism. But he came to a realization that when the icons have all
been destroyed the jurisprudential landscape can not be left bare;
reliable standards of judgment must be erected. The standards he
proposed were in what he called "jurisprudence of welfare." Pekelis
wrote:
Jurisprudence of welfare must not be corrupted into a juris-
prudence of expediency. It must remain faithful to Goethe's
admonition that "man where he appears significant behaves as a
lawmaker." The expediencies of specific situations must be
valued from a general viewpoint and shaped into an intelligible
of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARv. L. REV. 195 (1914);
J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 782-85 (1950); RUMELIN, HECK,
et al., THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS (Schoch transl. 1948).
17. PETRAZHITSKII, LAW AND MORALITY (Babb transl. 1955); CAHN, THE SENSE
OF INJUSTICE (1949).
18. R. WEST, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
REQUISITES OF LAW AND ORDER (1945), especially part III, pp. 213-52.
19. MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Nugent transl. 1900); VON JHERING,
LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (1913); EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Moll transl. 1936).
20. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (2d ed. 1871); VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORI-
CAL JURISPRUDENCE (1920).
21. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
22. Cossio, Phenomenology of the Judgment, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (P. Sayre ed. 1947) ; Romero, Man and Culture, in IDEOLOGI-
CAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 385 (Northrop ed. 1949).
23. JORDAN, FORMS OF INDIVIDUALITY (1927); GURVITCH, L'EXPERIENCE JURI-
DIQUE ET LA PHILOSOPHIE PLURALISTE DU DROIT (1935). (I would agree with the
authors cited that it is a matter of experience that institutions exhibit inten-
tionality, but I would not agree that direct apprehension can give the content
of that intentionality.)
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pattern. It is not enough that specific actions of governmental
agencies be wholesome and serve the expediency of the moment
and the needs of an individual situation. In the words of the
Nichomachean Ethics, "to be just, they must be done and distrib-
uted in a certain manner. And this is a more difficult task than
knowing what things are wholesome." A true jurist, mindful
of the general welfare, instead of merely investigating what
specific judicial action or administrative measure would best
serve the public welfare in individual situations, will ask himself
what canon of action can best serve that purpose, upon what
maxim, capable of becoming a universal law, the specific measure
can be predicated.
Concrete cases cannot be decided by general propositions-nor
without them. Even in the most narrow sense welfare is mea-
sured not only by the absolute amount of goods and services
enjoyed by men, but by their relative distribution as well. In
this sense, welfare and law both come under Dante's definition
of law, as proportion of man to man, the hominis ad hominem
proportio. It may be possible to psychoanalyze away the father
complex and the quest for security. But the quest for a conform-
ity to rules, for a recognizable pattern of action, for an ordo vo-
luntatis, is nothing else than a quest for harmony and beauty. It
is a trait of mankind; even more, it is the mysterious prime force
of our universe, which gives a rhythm to the crooning of savages
and the games of children and a geometrical form to the crystal-
lization of salt.24
Pekelis was writing in 1946, but he was back at the point of begin-
ning again in jurisprudence-a fixed order in the universe and a
natural need in men to pattern their relations after that order. But
Pekelis gives no inkling of how man's need for order is to be met.
Must man himself take the initiative, work it out to the best of his
ability, and accept the consequences of his own errors? Or is the
order of society beyond his control-a product of "social" conscious-
ness or "social" acts that individual men participate in but are power-
less to change? Savigny, the influential German jurisprudent, con-
ceived law (in Gierke's words) as "the positive result and living ex-
pression of the common consciousness of an organic community. ' 25
What is the basis of solution if the "common consciousness" is at
war with itself, or the "felt need," as the sociological jurisprudents
like to put it, is different with different segments of a community?
When labor and management are sorely at odds on an issue, must we
assume these groups to be separate organic communities whose in-
terests can never be reconciled, and their conflict resolved only by the
destruction of one or the other? This conclusion is required of Com-
24. Pekelis, The Case for a Jurisprudence of Welfare, 6 LAW. GUILD REv. 611,
618 (1946).
25. 1 GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SocIETY 223 (Barker transl.
1934).
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munist jurisprudence by its class-warfare premises, but it ought not
be found in our jurisprudence.
In our jurisprudence, rather, the answer ought to be more like the
one given by Francis B. Sayre in the often-violent era of labor rela-
tions before federal legislation put the stamp of legal respectability
on unions. In arguing against the use of the criminal conspiracy
doctrine in labor disputes, Professor Sayre said:
In those fields of industrial controversy where passion runs
high and where class conscious groups are arrayed in bitter fight
the one against the other, where each side with difficulty is re-
strained from open war and induced to substitute therefor settle-
ment by judicial action, the law has a very difficult and delicate
function to fulfill. Under the terrific thrust and strain of some
of the most tremendous social issues of the day, it is of far more
than usual importance that the law applicable to labor controver-
sies should express principles of justice evident to and accepted
by the great mass of mankind; above all else, such law must be
thoroughly predicable. Otherwise class groups will see in legal
decisions only the prejudice and bias of the individual judges;
and popular respect for the law and its administration by the
courts will wane to a possible danger point.2
Short of a dictatorship of the "proletariat," or the tyranny of a
Fuehrer who personifies the "common consciousness of an organic
community," what but reason can break down the dividing walls of
class interest? And what but reason and a sense of personal respon-
sibility can move each man as a citizen of the republic to take his
stand in fruitful and free relationships with his fellow citizens, one
among equals? Yet current jurisprudence gives little indication that
reason performs this service, and no explanation of how it is accom-
plished.
Legal realism and sociological jurisprudence are the two schools of
jurisprudential thought that flourished in the United States during
the first half of this century. They were apt for the problems we
faced in that period. We were united in allegiance to certain princi-
ples of justice. In a rapidly developing industrial society a casuistry
that restricted itself to the propositions in law books went astray.
Sociological jurisprudence said, "Look to the social result of applying
this particular rule to this particular behavioral situation-logic does
not operate in a vacuum." The legal realists said to the courts, "You
are actually doing things by your decisions that your formal opinions
do not say you are doing-be guided by reality, not by rationaliza-
tion." Both admonitions were eminently sensible in our situation.
But the nations struggling with new constitutions are seeking a sense
of social direction and a climate of personal "authenticity. 27 Their
26. F. Sayre, Ciiminal Conspiracj, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922).
27. ORTEGA Y GASSETT, CONCORD AND LIBERTY 20 (Weyl transl. 1946).
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problem is not the faithful application of agreed principles to new
social situations. They search the heavens for navigational stars.
Our problem was instrumental. Theirs is axiological.
You will gather that in current jurisprudence I found little help in
answering the question of what it is that enables men to cooperate
instead of working at cross-purposes. With respect to this question,
all jurisprudence that grounds itself in experience is after-the-fact
learning. It is not useful until the thing sought has been found. I
turned to an examination of our conceptions of the nature of man.
THE ANSWER SOUGHT IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF MAN
It is obvious that men must associate in cooperative effort in order
to satisfy even their most elemental needs of food, clothing, and
shelter. As Seneca put it:
Imagine ourselves as isolated individuals, what are we? The
prey, the victims of brute beasts-blood most cheap, and easiest
to ravage; for to all other animals strength sufficient for their
own protection has been given. The beasts that are born to
wander and to pass segregate lives are provided with weapons;
man is girt round about with weakness. Him no strength of claws
or teeth makes formidable to others. To man [deity] gave two
resources, reason and society; exposed as he was to danger from
all other creatures, these resources rendered him the most power-
ful of all. Thus he who in isolation could not be the equal of any
creature, is become the master of the world. . . . Society has
checked the violence of disease, has provided succour for old age,
has given comfort against sorrows. It makes us brave because
it can be invoked against Fortune. 8
It is significant that Spinoza, a millennium and a half later and a
scant century before the industrial revolution, in speaking of the im-
portance of society, should sound a new emphasis, in these words:
The formation of society serves not only for defensive pur-
poses, but is also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely necessary,
as rendering possible the division of labour. If men did not ren-
der mutual assistance to each other, no one would have either the
skill or the time to provide for his own sustenance and preserva-
tion ....
Suppose the individual man should be able to defend himself against
beasts, disease, the vicissitudes of the elements, and should be so dili-
gent and multi-skilled as to provide for his own sustenance and
shelter. There would still be a further reason why he would need the
assistance of some at least of his fellows, namely, for protection
against the depredatory of his own kind. For as Hobbes observed,
"the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
28. Cited in GROTTOS, DE JURE BELT AC PAcIs LIBRI TRES 12, n.2 (Carnegie
transl. 1925).
29. Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in 1 CHIEF WORKS OF SPINOZA
73 (rev. ed. 1891).
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machination or by confederacy with others .... ,80 Even Locke, who
did not take as pessimistic a view of man-without-society as Hobbes
did, still said that unless men were associated for the mutual protec-
tion of their property, their enjoyment of it (life, liberty, estate)
would be "very unsafe, very insecure. ' '31
These quotations indicate the three main facets of a biological fact
which Julian Huxley has summarized by saying that the "increased
control over and independence of the environment" that marks man
as the presently dominant species, with man for the first time, is ac-
complished not by the development of various specialized branches of
the species structurally adapted (e.g., hard covering to reflect light
and large water storage capacity, or small size and acute hearing, or
long legs and a ruminant's stomach, or heavy over-all body hair) to
life in the desert, the jungle, the plains, the mountains, the forests,
etc., but "by the complexity of his social life and his division of
labour. 3 2 The environment to which Huxley refers includes the "or-
ganic as well as the inorganic" and "in addition, the organic environ-
ment of an individual includes the rest of the species.'1 33
And what makes possible man's complexity of social life and his
di' ision of labor? Huxley says it is conceptual thought and true
speech. These capacities, he says, are distinctively characteristic of
man. They are the source of his uniqueness. 34 Because my whole
argument turns on the conceptual step between stimulus and response
in human behavior, I shall go briefly into a number of physical and
social disciplines in order to show recognition of it, something of its
nature and its social consequences.
The neurologist, C. Judson Herrick, in his studies of the evolution
of the cerebral cortex has followed the development of the physical
organs upon which these capacities depend. He has stressed the im-
portance of the development in man of a brain which is not dominated
by neural centers of any one sense organ, but which is balanced and
flexible, able to sort stimuli and assemble them in a nearly infinite
variety of combinations, and to delay reaction while the effects of
possible alternative courses of action are anticipated and considered,
thus eliminating much overt trial and error.35 Recent studies by
Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts, and by Arturo Rosenbleuth,
Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow, working through physiological
and functional approaches, respectively, have shed'a great deal more
light on the subject of how, and in what ways, ideas control and direct
30. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 (Everyman's ed. 1914).
31. LocKE, CIVIL GOVERNMENT 179 (Everyman's ed. 1924).
32. HUXLEY, EVOLUTION: THE MODERN SYNTHESIS 561-65 (1942).
33. Id. at 495-96.
34. Huxley, The Uniqueness of Man, in MAN STANDS ALONE (1941).
35. HERRICK, BRAINS oF RATS AND MEN (1926).
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human behavior. It is particularly significant that the latter group,
working with a behaviorist approach, should reach a conclusion that
vitiates the major premise of traditional behavioristic psychology.3 6
Kurt Goldstein, a physician and professor of psychology, has done
extremely interesting clinical work in the past ten years towards
proving that the capacity to deal with conceptualized reality is a neces-
sary attribute of mental normality. Dr. Goldstein has written:
Analysis has shown that the capacity to assume this abstract
attitude, also known as the "conceptual" attitude, is a prerequisite
for normal human behavior: acting voluntarily, taking the initia-
tive, shifting voluntarily from one activity to another, making
adequate choices, classifying objects or ideas, grasping the essen-
tials of a complex situation, synthesizing new ideas, reacting
correctly to objects or situations with which one is not directly
confronted, detaching one's ego from the outer world and react-
ing in an objectively correct manner.3 7
The cardinal point is that man, in his unique role as man, does not
react directly to his environment, but rather through the interpreta-
tive step of conceptualizing his environment and himself. Every man
has certain psycho-biological needs and impulses. He is located within
a geographical, ecological, and climatic context over which he has only
limited control. And he is subject to natural disasters of epidemic,
earthquake, and flood, over which, again, he has at best limited con-
trol. But man, to the extent he makes use of his unique characteristic
as man, does not act automatically or directly to fulfill his needs, vent
his impulses, or meet the challenges of environment. To some extent
at least, he can determine the effect environment, and even his own
experienced needs and impulses, will have upon his attitudes and ac-
tions. This fact is the source at once of the glory and damnation of
man.
Man sorts out his concepts, selects key concepts, and orders the
whole into a seemingly true picture of the real world of self and
environment. Dominant aspects of his geographical and ecological
environment may create a focus of attention upon themselves as key
factors. Climatic circumstances, biological and psychosomatic factors
may have the same influence. Disease, natural disasters, such as floods
and earthquakes, would seem to have an effect upon men's affairs
chiefly as hazards to the carrying out of courses of action based upon
an interpretation of self and environment.
Any particular man may make no attempt to perform this interpre-
36. Summarized in Northrop, Ideological Man in His Relation to Scientifically
Known Natural Man, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 407(Northrop ed. 1949).
37. Goidstein, Prefrontal Lobotomy: Analysis and Warning, Scientific Ameri-
can, Feb. 1950, p. 45. See also Goldstein, The Mental Changes Due to Frontal
Lobe Damage, 17 JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 187 (1944).
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tative process, but may passively accept the interpretation of others,
fixed in the products of culture and impinging upon him in a myriad
of ways from the day of his birth. But man, qua man, is not moved
automatically or directly by internal or external environment, and he
need not be moved in any particular direction by the stream of culture.
He may act in different directions, when he has gained the perspective
to see them, and may by his works change in some degree the direc-
tion of the cultural stream as it flows on to the next generation. This
fact is specifically affirmed by the psychologist, Rollo May. 8
Man acts upon the basis of some interpretation of reality, whether
partially his own or entirely culturally received. This fact must be
taken together with the fact, noted above, that man can fulfill his
basic needs only through cooperative action with others. Putting the
two together, we see that the fact that men in actuality have the same
needs and impulses and even the same external environment will not
necessarily enable them to work together to meet those needs. In
order to cooperate, they must act upon the same interpretation of their
needs and environment. In a free society the view of reality that
patterns the structure of cooperation will be the general conviction of
the community. But in any given society it may have been imposed or
insinuated by conquest, or demagoguery. Nevertheless, if there is to
be any cooperative action, that action, whether voluntary or forced,
must be in accordance with some common view of reality.
With respect to the social sciences and the humanities, Filmer S. C.
Northrop has made the most striking assertion in recent years that a
common view of reality is a necessary link between men associated in
a common undertaking.39 Anthropologist David Bidney has noted that
other contemporary philosophers, "such as A. N. Whitehead, Ernst
Cassirer, and John Dewey," are in agreement with Northrop that "the
major cultures of the Western and Eastern worlds 'involve basic
theoretical assumptions from which the social institutions and prac-
tices that they value proceed.' ,,40 Clyde Kluckhohn has found the
same thing to be true even of the primitive culture of the Navaho
Indians.4 Indeed, Bidney says that "most anthropologists and many
sociologists" accept the "thesis that native cultures reveal basic, philo-
sophical or metacultural presuppositions which serve to integrate their
38. MAY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR HuisELFs 85 (1953). See also Bidney, Human
Nature and the Cultural Process, 49 AmERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 375, 383-84(1951).
39. NORTHROP, MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946); NORTHROP, Locic OF THE
SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES (1947).
40. Bidney, The Concept of Meta-Anthropology and Its Significance for Con-
temporary Anthropological Science, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD
ORDER 323, 338 (Northrop ed. 1949).
41. Kluckhohn, The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFER-
ENCES AND WORLD ORDER 356 (Northrop ed. 1949).
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cultural perspectives. ' 2 This thesis, that the presuppositions of a
culture determine its empirical manifestations, underlies Pitirim A.
Sorokin's monumental study, Social and Cultural Dynamics, which
encompasses over twenty-five hundred years of human experience. 43
Men are social creators. Our need for society was created in us by
our Creator. But any human society that is in fact created is a prod-
uct of conscious calculation. To cooperate men must have a common
interpretation of reality-of their natures and the universe. Men's
views of reality differ and change. Accordingly we find, in history,
human coagulations of varying quantities, structure and tone, as men
shift about under various banners in their efforts to solve their con-
stant problems.
I have quoted or cited expert witnesses from biology, neurology,
physiology, psychology, philosophy, sociology, and anthropology to
prove that reason plays a part in human cooperation. I trust this
testimony will overcome the deterministic view of some psychologists
and social scientists, under which
[H] uman purposes are considered "elaborations" of tissue needs;
responsibility is reduced to successful socialization or a strong
superego; art, religion, science itself, become the accidental ex-
crescences of unconscious forces, biological drives, whose primary
aim is inhibited.4
Such a view of man is contradicted by the very purpose of psycho-
analysis. If the deterministic view were true, psychoanalysis could
only tell the individual why he acts as he does. It could never open any
hope for him that he could behave in more socially acceptable ways
that would relieve his frustration and unhappiness. The efficacy of
psychoanalysis depends upon some autonomous faculty in the patient
remaining in command, to recognize "reality" and to direct behavior
in accordance with its implications.
APPARENT OPPOSITION BETWEEN REASON AND EMOTIONS RESOLVED
Assuming the case is proved that human behavior is not completely
controlled by irrational psycho-biological drives and passions, the
next issue is the relation of these to reason. For it certainly would be
vain to argue, in the teeth of the evidence of modern psychology, that
42. Bidney, op. cit. supra note 40, at 343.
43. SoRoKiN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (1937). Sorokin has written
in RECONSTRUCTION Of HUMANITY 98, n.2 (1948):
All the important recent works on culture recognizes the integration of
a major culture into a single system based on a major premise and articulat-
ing it in all its main compartments. Spengler's Decline of the West (New
York, 1926-28), A. J. Toynbee's A Study of History (New York, 1934-37),
A. J. Kroeber's Configurations of Culture Growth (Berkeley, 1945), and
F. S. C. Northrop's The Meeting of East and West (New York, 1946) afford
examples of such works.
44. M. Arnold, Basic Assumptions in Psychology, in THE HUMAN PERSON
9 (M. Arnold & Gasson ed. 1954).
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these irrational factors have no effect on human behavior. Today,
emotions are regarded as mobilizing the energies of the person to meet
emergencies.
For example, the excitement in fear makes available bodily energy
with which to get away from the objects which excite the fear.
The tension in anger is an increase in the level of energy display,
in order that the organism can struggle against or meet the situa-
tion which caused the anger.45
In an older view, "emotions" included the energizing passions and
also the drives or needs of the body. There has been a strong tendency
in Western civilization to set up a relation of opposition between emo-
tions, so viewed, and reason.
The quotation from Aristotle, that "law i$ reason unaffected by de-
sire, ' 46 indicates that Greek thought knew this relationship of opposi-
tion between reason and emotions. A fuller quotation of the passage
reads,
[H] e who bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and
Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of
the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the mind
of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason
unaffected by desire.47
Cicero was asked to explain-if law is implanted in us by nature-
why 'people's laws differ. He said that "if the judgments of men were
in agreement with Nature, so that, as the poet says, they considered
'nothing alien to them which concerns mankind,' then Justice would
be equally observed by all."148 But, he said, we are perverted by those
about us or else,
[B]y that enemy which lurks deep within us, entwined in our
every sense-that counterfeit of good, which is, however, the
mother of all evils-pleasure. Corrupted by her allurements, we
fail to discern clearly what things are by Nature good, because
the same seductiveness and itching does not attend them.40
In Christian thought, the urgings of the flesh have often enough
been identified as the voice of the Devil-as with our own Puritans-
but submission to God's will tends to take the place of responsible
exercise of reason as the saving factor, especially in revivalist sects.
Rollo May emphasizes the influence of nineteenth century thought on
the "splitting up of the personality." He says, "For the late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century man, reason was supposed to give
the answer to any problem, will power was supposed to put it into
effect, and emotions-well, they generally got in the way, and could
45. ANDERSON, THE PYSCHOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT
258 (1949).
46. See text at note 6 supra.
47. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 11 16, 5 (Jowett transl. 1945).
48. CIcERo, DE LEGIBUS bk. I xii (Keyes transl. 1928).
49. Id. at xvii.
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best be repressed."50 I wish to suggest briefly an explanation of this
older view and then to suggest what seems a more useful view of the
relationship between these three aspects of personality.
Man being an animal, it would be surprising if he did not retain
in some measure a basic set of reflexive actions designed to protect
and preserve him. It is reasonable to assume that these crude, un-
taught actions would breach the obligations of a "civilized" society,
and would therefore be considered bad. Further, it does seem to be
true that severe stress sometimes has an atavistic effect on men, and
they make attempts at self-preservation more suitable to base animals.
Perhaps these facts explain the conception that the emotions urge evil
acts in response to the irrational demands of the flesh, and to the long-
run disadvantage of man, whereas reason curbs these irrational de-
mands and counsels the will to act in ways that will serve man's ulti-
mate good.
It is extremely significant that it was found necessary to introduce
the concept of "will" only with respect to actions directed by reason.
Rollo May notes that it was the role of will to see that men did the acts
prescribed by reason. When men's acts were the fruit of emotion it
was not said that the emotions counselled the will to do these acts and
the will brought them forth. This fact is clear in criminal law where
the defendant is ordinarily held responsible only for his "willful" acts.
In regard to matters extremely dangerous to human life, or other
paramount social interests, the defendant may be held to a standard
of rational control over his acts that he, personally, can not meet. A
man is legally responsible for causing death by acts done in the heat
of anger. The acts were activated by "emotion," not "will," but every
man is under obligation to "control" his emotions so that he does not
fly into a murderous rage except under the most extreme provocation.
This responsibility is a condition to the right to move about freely in
a civilized society.
Thus we see that, in this widely-held conception of man's nature,
emotions activate behavior, but reason does not. Reason was con-
ceived as being capable of producing a rational plan to guide behavior,
but incapable of inducing behavior in accordance with the plan. Nor
was the rational plan self-activating. It was the role of the will to
activate behavior counselled by reason. (Explanations of "will" in
this conception are notoriously difficult.) The emotions were to be
repressed because they would activate only evil behavior.
I suggest that on the basis of the evidence of man's nature presented
above, a simple explanation of will, and a reconciliation of reason and
the emotions can be made. We must begin with a different conception
of the emotions. If we view them as urging man to act, not just urg-
50. MAY, MAN'S SEAR CH FOR HIMsELF 50 (1953).
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ing him to take the basic, atavistic reflexive actions, the explanation
and the reconcilation become possible. This view accords with recent
investigations,5 and also with the older conception of the emotions to
the extent it identified the emotions with energizing and activating
passions.
Since man can survive only through action (cooperative action, in
fact), it is reasonable to assume that he has an elementary drive, need,
or urge to act. Action activated by this drive would serve to meet
other basic, psycho-biological needs of the person. When the actor
had made use of man's unique conceptualizing faculty, satisfaction of
these basic needs would be sought by acts "thought" to be appropriate
to meet the situation as understood. In emergencies, however, reason
might abdicate and "instinct" would call for the reflexive actions of
animal man. Only these latter acts, and not the emotions that mobilize
man to action, are in opposition to reason. The role of reason would
then be to inhibit and guide the elementary urge to act. Under this
conception, the basic drive to act would become the will to act when
reason gives its assent. 52 Will is emotion plus reason.
This conception of the interrelated personality aspects of reason,
will, and the emotions should not weaken the underpinnings of crim-
inal justice, or discommode Christian doctrine in any way. It reveals
at once why the Germans, for all their high-flown dialectics of free-
dom, ended with a powerful but barbaric society. When they turned
away from the natural law, humanistic tradition of Western civiliza-
tion, they removed censoring reason from the concept of will, and
glorified the irresponsible remainder as the source of good among
men.5 3 Untaught and unchecked by reason, the basic drive to act ran
berserk under the black banners of Nazism. The "will of the Volk"
was an unlimited license to act-so long as the acts were strong, bold,
and romantic. The Germans were "energetic and dangerous."
In order to hold that reason has an inhibitory and guiding function
over emotions it is not necessary to assert that reason functions with
respect to every act of the individual. On the contrary, this position
is perfectly reconcilable with psychology's empirical evidence that
most behavior is not immediately preceded by rational activity. Be-
cause the impetus of action does not proceed from reason, but from
emotions, it is not necessary for reason to function in order for the
person to act. However, it is necessary that reason shall not have
denied the emotions permission to find outlet in that kind of action
with respect to the particular situation.
51. See p. 266, supra.
52. The late William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, expressed a quite
similar view of the nature of will, though with more of a Gestalt emphasis, in
TEMPLE, NATURE, MAN AND GOD 223-24 (1935).
53. See Troeltsch, The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity, in GIERKE,
NATURAL LAW AND THEORY OF SOCIETY 201 (Barker transl. 1934).
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The statement, it will be noticed, is made in the negative. Emotion
can activate any behavior that has not been inhibited by reason. With
respect to most of the actions of daily life the function of reason in
guiding behavior is analogous to the operation of an automatic pilot.
The first time I experience ridicule I may be unable to decide which of
several alternative actions to take-whether to walk away, to return
ridicule, or to strike my persecutor. But after the incident I will think
about it and decide what I should have done. The next time, or the
time after, I will be sufficiently in control of myself that I will do what
I have rationally decided is the best thing to do when I am ridiculed.54
Suppose I have decided to keep my peace and walk away. After I have
met ridicule a number of times I will "automatically" turn away from
ridicule. I will not need to stop and think about it. I have already
left standing orders that whatever emotions are aroused by ridicule
shall be allowed to find outlet only in the action of walking away.
As with an automatic pilot, these standing orders can be changed.
I can re-think the situation. Perhaps I have found from experience
that walking away accomplishes peace, but not mutual understanding.
Perhaps I regard mutual understanding as worth achieving, even at
the risk that both peace and understanding will be lost. If I then
hypothesize that answering ridicule will lead to mutual understand-
ing, I may decide that in the future I will stand and answer ridicule.
The first time or two I subsequently meet ridicule my actions can not
be "automatic." I will have to make a conscious effort to act in the
new way which I have determined to be appropriate to this situation.
Once safely on the new course, the automatic pilot will again take over
and I will not need to apply reason, but, without pause for rational
calculation, will apply myself to answering the ridicule.
So it goes with respect to the numberless situations the individual
faces from day to day. It is not that reason is not in command, but
that reason's orders are standing, and the behavior has become
"habitual." It is a severe emotional strain for reason to "break" a
habit and establish a new one. In the example used above, walking
away served to reduce the emotional tension aroused in me by ridicule.
Now I do not allow myself to walk away but force myself to stand and
speak. Far from reducing tension, this may considerably heighten it
for the time being. However, if I find that standing and talking does
indeed, as reason has told me it will, effect both peace and mutual un-
derstanding, I will begin to find that standing and talking reduces my
emotional tension as well as, or better than, walking away did. I will
54. This process is clearly observable in children who are "learning to play"
with others, although here the course of action eventually adopted will probably
be that advised by parents. The child will be heard to say a number of times
what he is going to do "the next time" before he "works up his courage" enough
to actually do it.
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be through the emotional strain of changing over to a new "habitual"
reaction.
An automatic pilot may be set carefully or carelessly. So with the
responses a person's reason permits him to make in the behavioral
situations of daily life. In fact, a man may never become aware that
he is capable of selecting between alternative courses of behavior. A
measure of leisure and learning is necessary to put a man in a position
to consciously direct his future. Independent thought was useless to
"the quarry slave at night, scourged to his dungeon."5  But even with
the necessary learning and leisure, any man may neglect or ignore
what is possible to him and set his responses in every instance by what
"is done," or "is not done." It is notorious that we are all, in a sense,
pre-set by our childhood training. Our parents, and others in charge
of us during childhood and youth, build into us the courses we will
sail in various kinds of social weather. Even if our own reason coun-
sels some changes, we may never have the courage to cross over the
threshold of strangeness that separates us from the new.
"Cultural conditioning" has pervasive effect on the behavior of in-
dividuals. But somewhere the line of imitation and conformance had
origin in conscious choice and independent, rationally controlled, ac-
tion. Emotions activate us. Reason directs us-even though often the
direction is mediate, rather than immediatero
If the above analysis of the role of reason is correct, then reason
holds the key to action, although reason itself cannot act. And while
reason does not induce action in accordance with its prescriptions it
can release energy generated by the normal urge to act by accepting a
certain rational plan as a proper guide to behavior. (Of course, this
"acceptance" may be only negative and unconscious, by means of
cultural conditioning.) This acceptance, or commitment, is the source
of social power. In the study of politics, it is the dimension of political
dynamism.5 7
Doubtless the atavistic reflexive actions we retain as our animal
heritage were designed to keep us alive in some sort of universal com-
munity, assuming that homo sapiens without reason would have struck
an ecological balance with other forms of life. But man did have rea-
son, and had to seek out for himself the pattern by which he would
live with his fellows and other forms of life in this universe. And that
same reason made man aware of himself, that glorious being, as dis-
tinct from others. Consequently, the ageless struggle has been to
55. BRYANT, THANATOPSIS 26 (The Bibliophile Society ed. 1927).
56. The foregoing reconciliation of modern psychology and the natural law
conception of the role of reason appeared in preliminary form in Dorsey, Symbols:
Vehicles of Reason or of Emotion?, in SYMBOLS AND VALUES: AN INITIAL STUDY
441 (Bryson, Finkelstein, MacIver & McKeon ed. 1954).
57. Dorsey, Constitutions in Depth, 4 J. op Soc. ScI. 1, 4 (1953) (published
by the College of Law, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, China).
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strike a balance between getting other men to do things that will aid
me without having to do more than I am willing to do to aid them. It
is always I, not you, that I am first concerned with. Concern for
others is often expressed as "enlightened self-interest," showing that
it is something learned. My emotions are aroused by the things that
touch me, frighten, hurt, or excite me. As long as this is true, I can be
moved to action only by a situation that directly affects me. That
others are being beaten and enslaved does not arouse me to act unless
it comes into my own family, or perhaps, unless it occurs before my
eyes. Furthermore, once I am moved to action, if I am still serving
myself alone, I will expend myself only to a limit compatible with my
own well-being. I will not destroy myself, break my own health, or
jeopardize my own source of income or security, or my own safety
from punishment and slavery, in order to aid others.
Suppose, on the other hand, that I accept as a living faith, not just
as a logical set of statements, a rational plan that includes tenets that
violence shall be done to no man except after full and fair public trial
and only in punishment for violation of published laws. By commit-
ment I have put my emotions in the service of a cause larger than per-
sonal survival. I have put my emotions in the service of that portion
of mankind which joins me in pursuit of common social goals. Hence-
forth, if I am "faithful," my emotions will be aroused by injustice to
strangers and I will expend myself without stint to prevent that in-
justice. Thus men in community achieve protection and security at
the price of individual readiness to give up life, if need be, in order to
make life secure for others. In Christian teaching, this appears as the
aphorism "To find one's life, one must lose it."
Here, then, is the signal importance of committing oneself to a
rational plan: It yields the power of faith. The commitment can not
be to any private rational plan. It must be to a rational plan that
others accept, or will accept, because men must follow a common plan
to cooperate, and cooperation is necessary to human existence. When
even a relatively small number of men are united in a common faith
their power is incalculable. All inhibition being removed, there is no
limit to the satisfaction they can give themselves in action. Because
of their commitment, right action is clearly defined, and they have the
zeal of "moral righteousness." The power of a few men thus joined
in faith is legion.
But if faith is the source of power, doubt is the thief of power.
Doubt is the beginning of a re-examination by reason whether the emo-
tions should any longer be allowed to find outlet in the present ways
of behaving. It is the "Go Slow" sign. When we begin to question
whether we should act in established ways, we can not help but act
with less conviction, and therefore with less power. If we are reas-
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sured, we will loose the reef in our sails and drive forward again on
the old course. But if we cannot refute the doubt, nor justify it, nor
hit upon a better course, we will continue under short sail, proceeding
slowly. Dissatisfied with the waters we are in, yet, if we are not sure
where better waters lie we will be reluctant to drive headlong in any
direction, but will hold our power in check, biding time, fretting over
charts, and our navigating shots of sun and stars. The automatic pilot
will be disconnected pending resetting.
Conviction and commitment create power by removing reason's in-
hibition of man's natural urge to act. Doubt vitiates power because it
restores inhibition. But conviction of what? Doubt of what? There
can be but one answer: Conviction of the truth of the rational plan to
which commitment is made--of its interpretation of the nature of
man, of his needs and impulses and of the environment in which he
lives, and of the implications of that interpretation for human be-
havior; doubt of the truth of that interpretation and its implications.
Thus we arrive at an understanding of the central importance to
the effective functioning of a law process of what Pound calls "re-
ceived ideals." 8 Our ideals result from what we hold to be true about
the ultimate nature and purpose of man. It is right and good to "live
up to" these ideals. And we do that by acting in ways that we deter-
mine to be implied by them. From our ideals-from the conceptualiza-
tion, or rational interpretation of reality-the working relations of a
society are casuistically filled in during the process of living together.
Judicial decisions are "predicable," as Professor Sayre advises they
should be,59 because they apply accepted principles to concrete be-
havioral issues. Judicial decisions are effective to establish peaceful
working relations between such disputants as labor and management
not so much because they are backed by the organized force of the
community, as because they "express principles of justice evident to
and accepted by the great mass of mankind." °
Professor Sayre was pointing out a fact of common experience-
that "accepted principles of justice," or "received ideals," have a
coercion of their own. Ortega y Gassett makes clear the immense sig-
nificance of this fact. Writing about ideas that have become guides to
community action-which he calls "beliefs"-Ortega says:
Beliefs, to be sure, begin as ideas. But in the process of slowly
pervading the minds of the multitude they lose the character of
ideas and establish themselves as "unquestionable realities."
A belief, moreover, in a matter so intricate and stirring as the
problem of rule cannot exist of itself. It must derive from more
58. Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1933); Pound,
The Ideal Element in American Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 136 (1931).
59. See p. 260, supra.
60. F. Sayre, supra note 26, at 393.
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fundamental beliefs concerning human life and the reality of the
universe.... Political unanimity implies more than an agreement
on politics. However secondary political questions by themselves
may be, they can be resolved only if agreement prevails in non-
political matters, agreement which, in the last instance, concerns
the reality of the world.
Each of the European nations lived for centuries in a state of
unity because they all believed blindly-all belief is blind-that
kings ruled "by the grace of God." To hold such a belief they
clearly had to believe in the existence of God. Which meant that
they felt they lived not by themselves, alone with their man-made
ideas, but in the ceaseless presence of an absolute entity-God-
with which they had to reckon. This indeed is belief: to reckon
with an inescapable presence. And this is reality: that which
must be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. When the
peoples of Europe lost the belief, the kings lost the grace, and
they were swept away by the gusts of revolution.61
What Ortega is here emphasizing is that, while man acts in a con-
ceptualized reality, the conceptualization must have been "accepted"
or "received" to the point where its conceptual origin is forgotten and
it seems to be reality itself instead of a rational picture of reality.
Without this "commitment," as it would be put in religious terms, the
rational interpretation will not control the acts of individuals and
society will die, or abort, as the case may be. Conceptualized reality
that has become "unquestionable reality," is "the one and only power
that checks and disciplines man from within.' ' 62 Such a reality, be-
lieved in common, provides the framework within which disputes can
be peacefully and fruitfully worked out. As Ortega puts it:
Above the contending parties there persist in full validity certain
common circumstances to which they both can resort. These are
dogmas about life and the universe, moral norms, legal princi-
ples, rules regulating the very forms of the struggle. Thus both
sides feel that in their fight they are securely held and equally
protected by one familiar world. While they fight, state and so-
ciety stand firm around them.6 3
APPLICATION OF PRECEDING THEORY TO A SPECIFIC SITUATION
In the academic year 1952-53 I had an opportunity to pass along
my thoughts on constitution-making to students in the only province
of the Republic of China that has not fallen to Communism. That year
I taught Theory of Constitutional Law in the College of Law, National
Taiwan University, at Taipei, capital of the province of Taiwan
(Formosa), and present refuge of the Nationalist government. Mod-
ern China, to the advent of the Communist take-over on the mainland,
made 19 major attempts in forty years to establish constitutional
61. ORTEGA Y GAssETT, CONCORD AND LIBERTY 19-20 (Weyl transl. 1946).
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 16.
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government. 4 None of the documents ever came alive in the voluntary
obedience of the people. It must be kept in mind, however, that con-
stitution-making in China faced dismaying obstacles. Among these
were: the strangeness of the idea; the momentum of centuries behind
prevailing social institutions; the staggering task of moving half a
billion persons to new political forms without aid of modern means of
communication; the necessities of defending against national extinc-
tion or disintegration. With respect to the latter, it should be remem-
bered that after the revolution of 1911 overthrew the Manchu dynasty
the new Republic of China was not politically unified until completion
of the Northern Expedition by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928. The use of
force by foreign powers to emphasize their demands continued even
after that date, when Russia re-established its control over a North
Manchurian railway by armed invasion in 1930. Still, Kenneth Scott
Latourette reports that, after 1928, great strides were being made
under the leadership of the Kuomintang party (of Sun Yat-sen and
Chiang Kai-shek) to bring economic prosperity and political stability
to modern China. This progress was interrupted by the Japanese in-
vasion of Manchuria in 1931, and, with their further invasion of
China in 1937 and Communist activities, China was never subse-
quently free from armed aggression. 5
At the time I went to Taiwan to teach and learn, the conclusions set
out above were already formed. In a lecture before the Chinese As-
sociation for the United Nations, after summarizing the argument
above, I said:
It is faith that makes cooperation possible and yields the power
to make that cooperation effective. In the first place, the common
rational plan that has been accepted as a faith directs the diverse
efforts of many persons into cooperative channels and makes pos-
sible the multiplication of their human force. In the second place,
acceptance of that plan releases human energy and provides the
zeal, determination, and cohesion to achieve the goals defined by
the common rational plan.
This "acceptance" may be only negative and unconscious on the
part of a great many persons, in that they have been culturally
conditioned to act in those ways and have not cancelled the stand-
ing orders, thus preset, allowing their emotions to find outlet in
those ways. But real, lasting strength springs from conscious con-
viction of the truth of the rational plan, of the interpretation of
the nature of man, of his needs, impulses, and aspirations, of the
nature of the environment in which he acts to meet those needs
64. TsAo, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN CHINA 1-22 (1947).
65. LATOURETTE, HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA 119-220 (Penguin ed. 1954). The
Southeast Asia Defense Treaty (Manila Pact) Art. II provision for action of the
signatories against internal subversion directed from without must be taken, I
submit, as recognition that the type of "revolution" carried out by the Commu-
nists in China was in fact aggression. The Treaty text is printed in 31 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 393 (1954).
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and aspirations, and of the implications of that interpretation for
human behavior. For unless a man knows [what he believes and
why he believes it] he is vulnerable to doubt when [established
social] relations and ways of behaving are challenged. And doubt
is the great thief of power. Conviction gives power because it re-
moves reason's inhibition of man's natural urge to act. It releases
human energy. Doubt destroys power because it restores inhibi-
tion. When there is no confidence there is no zeal, no determina-
tion. When there is uncertainty we slow up to take our bearings.
This is the avenue of aggression that the Communists have
used to such good advantage. They point out individual instances
of injustice, a man who pays too much land rent, another who
does not receive a living wage, and they exploit these to induce
doubt in the minds of members of that society in the truths and
the social justice that they have lived by. When they begin to
doubt they are not so willing to produce abundantly and to defend
vigorously the old ways and the government that protects the
old ways. The power of that society to accomplish its ends and
to defend itself has become less. The Communists are then free
to act more boldly to induce more doubt and to sabotage by vio-
lence until, in time, the society is so far paralyzed by doubt and
indecision that a relatively small amount of force will succeed
in converting that society into a Communist society.6
I found that what I stated as theory my listeners accepted as fact.
It was a summary of their experience on the mainland of China. What
I brought to the Chinese that was new was the conception that social
paralysis need not be accepted, that faith rests on accepted truth, and
truth is subject to rational examination and re-evaluation. I carried
the message, based chiefly on Filmer S. C. Northrop's methodology
of the social sciences and the humanities,67 that thought and action
find unity and common purpose in a people's view of reality.
In order to show the implication of the preceding theory to a
specific situation, I will apply it to the problem modern China has
faced. To do this without a burdensome amount of background in-
formation I will need to assume that the reader is familiar with
principal events in China in the past 100 years. The discussion that
follows appeared substantially in The Journal of Social Science pub-
lished by the College of Law, Taiwan University.68
Until recent times China had community of thought and belief,
and community of personal action in accordance with that belief,
but little "political" action in the original sense of action as an or-
ganized group, as a "polis." This was natural. She had little need
66. Address by Gray L. Dorsey, 56th Forum of Chinese Association for the
United Nations, Oct. 18, 1952, subsequently printed in CURRENT FACTS AND
OPINIONS, Information Series No. 67, March 6, 1953, p. 19 at 26 (Taipei).
67. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946); NORTHROP, THE
LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES (1947).
68. Dorsey, Constitutions in Depth, 4 J. Soc. Scd. 1 (1953) (published by
College of Law, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, China).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss3/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
for political action during the long centuries when hers was seemingly
the only civilization in the world. China was least prepared to act
with unity and power against outsiders. There had been no outsiders
but barbarians. But when the West forced itself upon China, in the
last century, she had to take strong political action against outsiders
in order to -avoid destruction. It is to the everlasting credit of Dr.
Sun Yat-sen to have realized this and to have acted to meet the
emergency. Foreign nations ran China's customs, much of her bank-
ing, administered their own laws on her soil, took territory and trad-
ing facilities. This was the direct threat to the existence of Chinese
society-that her territory and her people would be divided up among
the foreign nations. An equal threat to Chinese society was the effect
on the mind of this forced intercourse with the West. Chinese who
came into contact with Westerners were falling away from Chinese
ways and losing Chinese beliefs.
China needed much more political power to remain free and inde-
pendent. First she borrowed the weapons that had proved so effective
against her. But the material instruments of power were not enough.
Then China borrowed-first through reforms under the Empire, then
through revolution-the forms of political organization of the power-
ful Western nations. Because we were occupied at the timeo with
instrumental problems, not value problems, China was not fore-
warned by the Western political, thought from which she borrowed
that a constitution must have dimension in the depth of a people's
convictions before political power will flow into the forms of political
authority it defines. China shortly discovered this the hard way.
Chinese still thought and acted like Chinese, although they promul-
gated an American-English-French constitution after the successful
revolution of 1911. Yuan Shih-kai, who gained support as a revolu-
tionary leader, betrayed the revolution and tried to found a new
imperial dynasty. China's revolutionary leaders turned to the Russian
example for help in the problem of consolidating a successful revolu-
tion. Lenin was the modern master of the art of acquiring, holding,
and wielding political power. The Chinese leaders adopted his de-
mocratic centralist organization of a ruling party to bring social
order out of chaos.
In order to make China powerful enough to survive, Dr. Sun ad-
vocated the regeneration of the Chinese people, as well as political
reorganization. This he hoped to do by awakening a national spirit
and by redistributing wealth and stimulating the production of more
wealth. To make possible the regeneration of the people and the
protection of the Republic, the people's power, min ch'uan (which
was one of Dr. Sun's famous "Three People's Principles"), was to be
69. See discussion of jurisprudence, pp. 255-61, supra.
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exercised through the ruling party, organized on the principle of
democratic centralism. When these things had been accomplished and
the people had been tutored in self-government, the people's power
was to be exercised through representative government constitution-
ally defined. War intervened. Political power and military power
were magnificently forthcoming to withstand and defeat foreign mili-
tary aggression. War passed. The Communists hurried to the north
and got military materiel from the Russians. Political naivet6 pre-
vented friendly nations from rendering desperately needed support
and aid. Under circumstances that were still unfavorable, the Con-
stitution under which the present Nationalist government acts was
promulgated. But political power, the power of united group action,
evaporated before the Communists. The mainland fell. President
Chiang Kai-shek has said that this was "not due to the overwhelming
strength of the Communists, which was not strong enough to defeat
our Revolutionary Army, but due to the organizational collapse, loose
discipline, and low spirit of the [Kuomintang] Party. 701
Is the constitution of the Nationalist government of China a prod-
uct of the basic convictions of the people? Will it engender the
support that creates political power? Many persons have expressed
the opinion that the loss of the mainland would have been avoided
if less attention had been given to military matters and more atten-
tion given to such matters as land reform and economic justice. Min
sheng was Dr. Sun's principle for economic reconstruction and was a
"platform plank" of the Kuomintang Party, which President Chiang
Kai-shek heads.
However, even if min sheng had been more fully implemented on
the mainland, there would still have existed deep, basic contradictions
between the form of political organization and traditional Chinese
morality and wisdom. It can be seen very plainly in a comparison of
views of reality. Of necessity, China sought political power. But
the whole idea of political power is itself alien to the Chinese concep-
tion of the universe as a sensed oneness, or unity, which includes
the ordered totality of immediately observed phenomena. This view
of reality leads to harmony of men in nature, through a spirit of all-
embracing fellowship, compromise, adherence of each man and crea-
ture to his proper way, and attention to propriety. The Greek heritage
in the conception of reality of Western nations is of minute entities,
unseen and even unimaginable, postulated to exist behind and beyond
the sensed man or the sensed earth, air, fire, and water, and to give
rise to these sensed phenomena, and of a universe composed of such
discrete entities joined in mathematical ratios and proportions into
70. President Chiang Kai-shek, in his speech at Tsungtsai, introducing the
reform program of the Kuomintang in July, 1950, CHINA HANDBOOK 34 (1952-53).•
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one universal rational order, knowable by man and increasingly sub-
ject to his control. This view of reality leads to power of men over
nature and other men, and to justice through a constituted order of
men in accordance with true knowledge of the rational order in the
universe. (The idea that men constitute the social order is the seed
of constitutional law.) This latter view of reality is also the root of
modern science. Thus the introduction of modern science and of
Western political forms into China every day wrought myriad con-
tradictions with the dictates of traditional Chinese morality and
knowledge. The very success of building political power wore away
the foundations of power in the common faith of China-which was
still that of the traditional view of reality.
Many of the best minds of China were never brought to bear on
the task of building a new faith for modern China. China was
transported overnight into a Republic. For three thousand years it
had been right for the emperor to serve the people and the people
to be loyal to the emperor. Now all at once it was wrong. Formerly
government had run up to the emperor. Now it was to run down to
the people. China was literally in an upside-down world where right
was wrong and up was down. The peoples of Western civilization
have redefined truth and right every few hundred years and revolved
in every aspect of political, social and personal authenticity. This
had never happened to China in all her recorded history prior to
1911. China had known many revolutions, but only dynasties had
revolved. Apparently the revolutionaries, including Dr. Sun himself,
had no clear realization that their actions implied such a complete
and thorough revolution. Dr. Sun thought the ancient Chinese moral-
ity and social knowledge the best that any people had ever developed.
The old morality, the old truth of social accommodation were to be
kept. The new physical sciences and modern political organization
were simply to be used to make China strong enough to live in her
old ways. But the revolutionary fathers of the Republic nevertheless
set China on the path of fundamental change by rejecting what had
been politically true in China for three thousand years. All the re-
cent studies of culture and society have shown that a society is all
one piece. If part of what a society has believed is found to be wrong
then a whole redefinition of its truth must be made, and its common
faith must undergo a corresponding change.7 1
Nothing in the thought of China prepared Chinese intellectuals to
realize the significance, of the basic contradiction between trying to
introduce new political truth while keeping the same moral truth.
71. SOROKIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (1937); see TOYNBEE, A STUDY
OF HISTORY (1937); KROEBER, CONFIGURATIONS OF CULTURE GROWTH (1945);
NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946).
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Nothing like this had happened before. When Buddhism had come
into China it had come at the fundamental level of belief, not at the
subsidiary level of one phase of human action. Furthermore, it was
quite compatible with the Taoist element already present in Chinese
thought. Since fundamental truth had always remained essentially
unchanged in the Chinese tradition, the Chinese people had been free
to give their attention to the application of that truth to practical
affairs. There was little interest in, or even awareness of, funda-
mental premises of Chinese society. The Chinese were so deeply
immersed in living what was true for them that it was indeed reality
itself and beyond knowing as conscious belief. Chinese intellectuals
who saw that Western truth was inseparably imbedded in Western
forms of political organization and saw the danger of harboring con-
flicting social truths found it almost impossible to arouse others.
Lacking guidance in their own tradition many Chinese intellectuals
turned to Western thought. But, as I have indicated above with re-
spect to jurisprudence, our scholars were occupied with instrumental
problems, and current thought of Western civilization did not contain
the wisdom of its revolutionary experience. The social and political
sciences were separate, autonomous, and factual. By looking to them
one could not discover that political truth could ever be in conflict
with moral truth. In this respect, with the exception of Whitehead,
philosophy of that period was little better. Current political science
and philosophy both adjured the scholar to be morally neutral. John
Dewey's pragmatic philosophy was very influential among those
Chinese scholars and educators who in turn were most influential in
Chinese thought.
China needed a new basis for strong and stable political institu-
tions, or new political institutions that would be in harmony with and
draw support and sustenance from the old morality. But while moral
purpose and social cohesion were being worn away by the devasta-
tion of prolonged war and by the contradictions between moral truth
and political truth, the men most capable of rebuilding concord re-
mained aloof from that task. This is not a matter for personal re-
criminations, but true tragedy. They shunned the task not for base
reasons but out of intellectual conviction.
Into this situation the Communists came, bearing a new faith, new
hope, new promise, new certainty after years of torturing contradic-
tions, and promises of a bright new world to be built by the masses.
They came as bearers of a faith and they advanced by being sowers
of doubt. The Communists have developed a new kind of warfare
that destroys political power by inducing doubt about the truth a
people have lived by and thus drying up the energy in support of that
truth. China was particularly vulnerable to this form of warfare
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because of the situation just outlined above. The more so because of
corruption in the ruling party. (But it must not be forgotten that a
common faith is what raises men above self-interest to action for the
common good. When that faith has been undermined, probity in
public office is more difficult to find.) It was comparatively easy to
create unrest, dissatisfaction, doubt, political paralysis. Then the
Communists took over the mainland with inferior military strength.
If the foregoing analysis be true, then it is clear that a reform that
only reorganizes political institutions or replaces individuals will not
touch China's real problem. The problem is not one of political or-
ganization, but of political dynamism. Democratic centralism was
devised as the most efficient means of concentrating the power of a
minority party and wielding it in such a way as to control the masses,
thereby acquiring the political power of the masses without waiting
to bring them to political awareness. Its genius in a country with
illiterate and politically inert masses is that it enables men in posi-
tions of political authority to acquire great political power without the
political dynamism of a common faith being at work among the
masses. But in order for democratic centralism to be successful that
dynamism must be at work among the members of the party. If they
have no common faith to direct, sustain and inspiie them, they will
have no political power of their own with which to act on the masses
to create more power-though they may be held together by the stern-
est discipline in the tightest unity of organization. And if the dyna-
mism is not in them it will not be in the nation they lead. Leninism
without Marxism will die unless it is wedded to some other version
of man's destiny and the proper ends to be achieved by the political
power acquired.
The faith that is the dimension of depth in the constitution of
China will rest upon a new perception of the Chinese view of reality.
But if China is to keep the forms of political organization and the
physical science she has borrowed, that view of reality will include
the latest results of Western postulational science as well as the valid
immediate-apprehension observations that. led to the traditional
Chinese view of reality. China can not borrow scientifically and or-
ganizationally from the West and at the same time deny her truth.
She must spurn all the fruits of the West or come to terms with its
moral truth. But this emphatically does not mean that China must
deny her own moral truth. It only means she must find the synthesis.
Such a synthesis can only be found by going to the common root
of. the particular aspects of truth represented in morality, ethics,
political science, economics. That which is unquestionably true about
the nature of man and the universe is to be obtained through the
interpretation of man's most objective knowledge about himself and
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the universe. Therefore, it would be principally encompassed in a
philosophy of science and a philosophical anthropology.
There is another consideration that suggests that the only solution
to the problems of modern China is to go to the roots of human co-
operation and perceive what it is that Chinese now hold to be true,
and the implications of that truth for morality, ethics, and social
and political order. This consideration is the fact that China's rev-
olution also sought, to a greater or lesser extent, a redistribution of
wealth, respect, and the other things men value. By limitation to be
imposed on governing power it also sought an area of personal free-
dom. None of these things can be attained without the influence of
a commonly held view of reality, that, as a directing idea is the crite-
rion for resolving conflicting interests, and as a common faith is the
source of the inner government of morality that sustains in practice
the legal delineation of these personal rights.
There is no real conflict between personal freedom and effective
political action once a people has found its common faith and has
achieved an awareness of its implications. Personal freedom within
a common faith does not weaken but in fact strengthens political
action, because the common faith channels the many separate acts
of individuals into furtherance of the common good. Many more
minds are brought to bear on the society's problems than when all
is left to the few in government. Many more backs are willingly
bent to common tasks.
Since all political power ultimately depends upon releasing the
energy of millions of individuals, that society will be strongest in
which the individuals most strongly hold the common faith, most
fully consider a threat to it a personal threat to themselves, and most
willingly assume personal responsibility to promote and protect the
common welfare. Jean Brissaud put the matter well some fifty years
ago: "The body draws its strength from the vitality of the cells; these
must have a life of their own; it is the same with society; the more
vigorous the individual, the more powerful the society. It is not the
atrophy of the individual that should be sought, but his full develop-
ment."7
2
LOVE AS A FACTOR IN ORDERING SOCIETY
The thoughts, indicated above, on the constitutional problem of
modern China were well-received in Taiwan. 73 Subsequent reflection
and events have not caused me to question the conclusions there
72. JEAN BRIssAuD, COURS D'HIsTOIRE GENERALE DU DROIT FRANCAIS PUBLIC ET
PRrvn § 26 (1904). The volume on public law is translated and published as
Vol. 9 in "The Continental Legal History Series," under the title, HIsToRY OF
FRzNCH PuBuc LAw (1915).
73. The article was translated into Chinese and published in THE CHINA
REzviuw, Hong Kong, a periodical of general circulation throughout Southeast
Asia.
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stated. But I have become aware of the fact that the analysis was
still not complete. The piece that has just fallen into place is love.
Ortega y Gassett says ideas about life and the universe that have
become unquestionable reality hold contending parties securely in
one familiar world so that they are united in one societas, though
they contend on a particular issue. But what if analogy is made to
criminal, rather than civil, law? Is the man who does not live up to
the letter of the law no longer a member of the society he has of-
fended? Is he a "beast," a "mad dog," a "fiend"? And if so, why
should he be expected to change his behavior so that when he emerges
from prison he will obey the laws?
Gregory Zilboorg has recently reminded us of the point made by
Thomas Aquinas that "punishment, in order to prove fully effective
and therefore satisfactory and serve the purpose of rehabilitation,
must be accepted by the one on whom the punishment is meted out.'7 4
Why should a man accept punishment? If he has demonstrated weak-
nesses of character, has failed to live by the law, what hope does lie
have to do better? Why should he want expiation and a new chance?
'The answer of Christian doctrine has usually been in terms of the
salvation of the individual's soul in future existence. But the Chris-
tian Existentialists give an answer in terms of present existence that
is relevant to the problem of making constitutions live. Paul Tillich
writes :
If I were asked to sum up the Christian message for our time in
two words, I would say with Paul, it is the message of a "New
Creation." Let me repeat one of his sentences (II Cor. 5: 17) in
the words of an exact translation: "If anyone is in union with
Christ he is a new being; the old state of things has passed away;
there is a new state of things." Christianity is a message of the
New Creation, the New Being, the New Reality which has ap-
peared with the appearance of Jesus who for this reason, andjust for this reason, is called the Christ. For the Christ, the
Messiah, the selected and anointed One, is He who brings the new
state of things. 5
In comparison with the question of the new reality, Tillich says,
"[E] verything else, even religion or non-religion, even Christianity or
non-Christianity, matters very little and ultimately nothing."7O The
new reality enables us to be reconciled to an existence in which our
good works are never good enough. We can put off "self-rejection,
disgust, and even hate" of ourselves, because of the message that "a
new reality has appeared in which you are reconciled."T" Being in-
74. ZILBooRG, PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 97 (1954).
75. Tillich, The New Being, 19 RELIGION IN LIFE 511 (1950).
76. Id. at 513.
77. Id. at 515.
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dividually reconciled, men are reunited with each other. The "social
healing" of the new reality preserves mankind.
Where one is grasped by a human face as human, although one
has to overcome personal distaste, or racial strangeness, or na-
tional conflicts, or the differences of sex, of age, of beauty, of
strength, of knowledge, and all the other innumerable causes of
separation-there new creation happens !78
Jack L. Pierson states the Christian Existentialist view of forgive.
ness in these words:
Forgiveness does not mean that the sin isn't there-that we pre-
tend the sin never happened. Forgiveness is the willingness to
restore the relationship while fully recognizing the existence of
the evil-of the sin in the situation. The problem is one of restor-
ing the relationship that was destroyed. And the Christian Gospel
is that the relationship has been restored because God has taken
upon Himself the cost of accepting us as we are.7 9
Tillich writes: "Resurrection happens now, or it does not happen at
all."8o Resurrection occurs when the power of separation of man from
man is overcome by the power of reunion. This can never occur if
acceptance must be earned by "doing right," because all men are
fallible.
A comparison of the Old and New Testaments shows an emphasis
on law in the former, on love-redeeming love-in the latter. The
Pentateuch lays down precise and detailed rules of behavior and
sounds in retribution. But Christ puts the requirements of love over
the laws of Moses and the Romans, and admonishes forgiveness. "On
these two commandments [to love the Lord, and your neighbor as
yourself] hang all the law and the prophets," 81 Jesus is quoted by
Matthew as saying in reply to a lawyer's question.
In terms of reason itself, the use of love in ordering society can be
seen. As between a view of reality proved wrong by methods of
rational investigation and a view of reality not yet proved wrong,
there is objective basis for choosing the latter. But using force to
build the structure of society implied by that view of reality is an
equivocal enterprise because that view of reality has behind it only
human, and therefore fallible, authority. And it may be proved wrong
tomorrow. The principle to be derived is that the social reformer's
zeal must be tempered by love for the human beings he is attempting
to reform, or else his professed help is in fact tyranny. The genocide
78. Id. at 516.
79. From a lecture (one of a series of four) on theology from a Christian
Existentialist point of view by Jack L. Pierson, March 24, 1954 in St. Louis, Mo.
I wish to thank Mr. Pierson for the benefit of a copy of his lectures and for
guidance, by private discussion and bibliography, on the thought of Christian
Existentialism.
80. Tillich, op. cit. supra note 75, at 517.
81. MATTHEW 22: 35-40.
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convention and the Declaration of Human Rights are concrete recog-
nitions of this principle.
Love is also useful to temper reason. This function of love is found
in such widely disparate places as the traditional Chinese conception
of the method of ordering society and the Anglo-American common
law.
The classic Chinese statement on ordering society is in the Great
Learning, attributed to Confucius. There it is said of "the Ancients,"
who were credited with superior wisdom,
[I]n order to govern well their state, they began by establishing
good order in their family; in order to establish good order in
their family, they began by perfecting themselves; in order to
perfect themselves, they began by obtaining rectitude of heart;
in order to obtain rectitude of heart, they began by obtaining sin-
cerity in their intentions; in order to obtain sincerity in their
intentions, they began by perfecting their knowledge.
The perfecting of knowledge consists of pursuing the study of
things.82
In this Chinese conception, perfecting of knowledge was accom-
plished by "rectification of names." "Rectification of names" was
quite similar to modern semantics. The purpose was to keep thoughts
and actions in accord with reality. But "rectification of names" did
not give sincerity.83 Sincerity is obtained by Jen. ' Liang Chi-chao
writes, of the meaning of Jen:
[I] n order to know what "Jen" is, it is necessary first to know
what man is. What is the origin of the conception of "Man"? By
inference from the existence of ourselves we know of the exist-
ence of others like us. As we have round heads, fiat feet, hori-
zontal eyes, and intelligence, therefore any being of similar ap-
pearance and possessing similar qualities we recognize as our own
species "Man." The conception "Man" is therefore derived from
recognition of others and self. This recognition is "Jen." There-
fore is the Chinese character "Jen" formed from the combination
of the characters two and man. . . . Without the association of
one man with another the conception "Man" cannot be formed. In
other words, if there were only one man living on earth, that
which we call personality would have no way of exhibiting itself.
Confucius says, "When one who is 'Jen' desires to establish him-
self, he must establish others; wishing to elevate himself he must
elevate others. To understand another's desires by inference from
one's own desires is the way to 'Jen.'" (The Analects) . . . The
82. Y.M. HU, fIWDE PHILOSOPHIQUE ET JURIDIQUE DE LA CONCEPTION DE "MING
ET DE- "FEu" DANS LE DRoIT CHINOIs 43-44 (1932), quoted in Dorsey, Two Ob-jective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND
WORLD ORDER 443-44. (Northrop ed. 1949). (The translation from the French
is mine.)
83. Y.M. Hu, op. cit. supra note 82, at 41, cited in Dorsey, op. cit. supra note
82, at 452.
84. Dorsey, op. cit. supra note 82, at 452.
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real meaning of "establishing others," and "elevating others"
comprehends not individuals but the whole of mankind. Since the
whole of mankind consists of others and self, to elevate the whole
of mankind is to elevate oneself. To try to understand this prin-
ciple by inferring the wants of others from our own desires, is the
way to "Jen." To be lacking in "Jen" is to be like a benumbed
hand or foot which is insensitive to pains in other bodily mem-
bers. So the wholeness of personality which comes from the as-
sociation of two or more persons lacks "Jen" when it is insensitive
to the pains of another; it attains "Jen" when sensitiveness is
keen. In short, the lack of "Jen" is insensitiveness to fellow-feel-
ing; the fulfillment of "Jen" is the state of keen sensitiveness. 85
The sensitivity to the pains and desires of fellow men-or, as it might
as well be put, sensitivity to the requirements of love for fellow men-
prevented the detailed and pervasive Confucian ethics from becoming
rigid and oppressive.
Paul Sayre includes love as a decisional factor in his theory of law.
He has identified seven categories of the Good, including love, which
together constitute "the ultimate test of the law."sG I believe this is a
wise perception of a role that love plays in Anglo-American juris-
prudence.
My own conception of that role is that love mediates between rigid
logic proceeding from inadequate premises, and the actual human be-
ings who are what they are and need justice in accordance with their
true nature. A judge who lets logic run its inexorable course when he
just knows in every fiber of his being that the decision it requires is
wrong, is obeying man's product and denying man. The legal realists'
revelation that judges don't usually allow themselves to be misled by
logic was a little like coming from a conference behind the barn and
announcing to your mother that there are two sexes. From the un-
startling revelation that judges reach a decision and then justify it by
logic, I do not believe a conclusion can validly be drawn that the judg-
ing process is irrational. It is just that the facts must be laid against
two realities-the ideals, principles, and rules of the particular so-
ciety's conceptualized view of reality, and the new reality, as Tillich
calls it, in which obligations are gauged by the requirements of love.
If we live in these two realities at once, it is "rational" to weigh de-
cisions in the scales of both realities.
Furthermore, I do not believe that it is an admission of irrationality
even to accept Judge Hutcheson's statement that the judge,
[B]rooding over the cause, waits for the feeling, the hunch-
that intuitive flash of understanding that makes the jump-spark
85. C.C. LIANG, HISTORY OF CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHT 38-43, quoted inDorsey, op. cit. supra, note 82, at 452-53.
86. P. Sayre, An Ethical Approach to Legal Philosophy, 7 J. LEGAL ED. 369(1955).
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connection between question and decision and at the point where
the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sets its light along the
way.8 7
The judge makes this intuitive leap only "after canvassing all the
available material at his command and duly cogitating on it.'88 There-
fore the judge has before him all the facts and all the propositions of
law that the parties claim are applicable. The decisional process that
follows, as described by Judge Hutcheson, is perfectly reconcilable
with the most rigorous of all rational calculation-theoretical physics.
After the data of experience is all assembled, the real meaning of it
can not be derived by deduction or logical abstraction, Albert Einstein
tells us. The truth about reality, he says, can only be gained by a free
leap of the imagination. 9 Of course the resulting theory-"the con-
cepts and the laws connecting them with each other"-must be veri-
fied experimentally."
The fact is that reason includes logic and the searching, postulating
imagination. However, after imagination has leaped and landed, logic
must verify against experience, and if it can not, imagination must
leap again. So it must be for the judge-although with respect to so-
cial questions the proper term for the searching faculty of the mind
is conscience instead of imagination. If the judge can not justify his
decision, he must try again. The voice of the individual judge's con-
science is checked against the cumulative experience of the community
by the logic of the opinion. The growth of the common law has been
in those occasional cases when none of the competing analogies satis-
fies and responsible conscience has leaped beyond logic and experience
and brought back a principle or rule from the "new reality" of the
brotherhood of man. An example of this process is the development
of the fraud doctrines in the law of contracts and conveyances. 1
I have presented evidence or argument to show that love is a
stronger bond of society than faith,92 that love restrains tyrannous
violence, that love tempers reason. There is at least one more vital
role that love plays in ordering society, and this possibly more im-
portant than all the rest. It is the compulsion of love; strength
through complete vulnerability. Asians understand it. I believe love
87. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929), quoted in FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 103 (1930).
88. FRANK, op. cit. supra note 87. The words quoted here are Judge Frank's
summary of Hutcheson.
89. EINsTErN, THE WORLD As I SEE IT 36-38 (1934).
90. Id. at 36.
91. Speaking of the doctrine of part performance of an oral contract to convey
land, Corbin writes, "Even the tough-minded courts that are most insistent upon
logic and consistency are human enough to be affected by a showing of severe
hardship and injustice." 2 COnBIN, CONTRACTS § 435 (1950).
92. I am using "faith" here in the sense in which it is used above, namely,
commitment to a view of reality and the social norms implied by it.
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in this self-renouncing sense is the secret of child rearing among the
Chinese, who cannot bear to strike a child. Hundreds of Chinese chil-
dren will stand quietly in line waiting for a bus, because it is expected
of them. Yet, put the same children in a school for American children
abroad where discipline may be physical, and the Chinese will shove
and shout with the best of them. The compulsion of love had delight-
ful results when used by a baby on supposedly tough mobsters in
Damon Runyon's story, Little Miss Marker.
Mahatma Gandhi made a revolution with love.
CONCLUSION AND APPLICATIONS
Throughout the preceding discussion I have assumed that the use
of organized force by a power group called government is a factor in
ordering society, as I believe it must be in any society short of a "City
of God." Therefore, the discussion determines with four factors,
namely, reason, faith, love, and force. No attempt has been made to
assay the value of each. However, because it has been shown that
reason, faith, and love are useful factors in the ordering process, I be-
lieve a conclusion can be drawn in this form: The limited use of organ-
ized force that distinguishes constitutional government from tyranny
will be more or less effective to maintain civil order depending upon
the presence or absence in the group sought to be governed of ties of
reason, faith, and love.
Because this paper is already long, I shall be content to suggest, in
summary form, the applications I think most urgent.
1. Strong, stable, non-Communist, independent nations in Asia and
Africa are possible only if they receive political help as well as mili-
tary and economic help. We must not boggle over the word "political"
on the ground that such aid would be interference with internal af-
fairs. The Communist aggression is political aggression. It destroys
a people's ties (of reason, faith, and love) to each other and to govern-
ment, and thus destroys power to act as a polity. Aid in combatting
political paralysis can not avoid being political. If the polity is para-
lyzed, or wracking itself to death with internal factionalism, the
triggers will never be pulled when the Communists come into the gun-
sights, and the plows will make furrows for Communist crops. In the
Manila Pact we have recognized the need for help against political
aggression. We must fully follow up this realization.
2. Political aid, to be acceptable and effective, must be given in ways
compatible with the central theme of the preceding analysis-that
men are essentially self-moved. Political power springs from the
energy of individuals released by commitment and channeled into co-
operation by love and a common faith. When a segment of humanity,
struggling to be a nation, has no common faith-no political soul-you
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss3/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
can be sure they will want one. The abyss of chaos is frightening.' We
can help them to know themselves. This is the task of what Colonel
Nasser has called the "second revolution." 93
3. There are two basic reasons why we can help these peoples to
know themselves. The first is that they are where we stood in 1776.
The peoples of Asia and Africa have already possessed democracy in
their dreams 4 They will have it-or a package under the same label.
93. The leader of the Egyptian revolution, and now head of state, Col. Gamel
Abdul Nasser, has written a most significant account of what happened after the
overthrow of the old regime was accomplished. (In reading the quotation, it
should be kept in mind that Colonel Nasser uses "political" in a narrower-and
probably more orthodox-sense than I have used it in the preceding discussion.
Matters of stability, cohesion, and purpose that I have discussed as political, he
discusses as social.) Speaking of the period after the overthrow of the old regime
on July 23, 1952, he writes:
'I had imagined that the whole nation was ready and prepared, waiting
for nothing but a vanguard to lead the charge against the battlements,
whereuponit would fall in behind in serried ranks ready for the sacred ad-
vance toward the great objective. The facts became clear to me after the
twenty-third of July.
The vanguard performed its task and charged the battlements of tyranny,
It threw out Farouk and then paused, waiting for the serried ranks to come
up in their sacred advance toward the great objective. How long it had to
wait! True, crowds came, there was no end to them.
But how far the reality from the dream! The masses that came were
disunited and divided groups of stragglers. The sacred advance toward the
great objective was stalled, and there emerged a prospect dark and fore-
boding, full of danger.
We were not ready for this. So we set about seeking the views of leaders
of opinion and the experience of those who were experienced. It was our
misfortune that we were not able to obtain very much. Every man we ques-
tioned had nothing to recommend except to kill someone else.
Every idea we listened to was nothing but an attack on some other idea.
If we had gone along with everything we heard, we would have killed off all
the people and torn down every idea; and there would have been nothing left
for us but to sit down among the corpses and ruins, bewailing our evil for-
tune and cursing our wretched fate!
Peoples preceding us on the path of human progress have passed through
two revolutions, but they have not had to face both at once; their revolutions
were in fact a century apart in time. But as for us, the terrible experience
through which our people is going is that we are having both revolutions at
once.
The political revolution, to be successful, must attain the objective of
uniting all the elements of the nation, binding them together solidly, and
instilling the idea of self-abnegation for the sake of the country as a whole.
But the social revolution, from the moment of its first appearance, shakes
values and loosens principles, and sets the citizenry as individuals and as
classes to fighting each other. It gives free reign to corruption, doubt,
hatred, and egotism."
This is a translation of three articles written for the Egyptian weekly, "Akher
Sa'A," on the occasion of the first anniversary of the revolution, quoted in Walter
Lippmann's column published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 28, 1954, p. 3B,
cols. 1-2. Colonel Nasser now has a book in print, EGYPTIAN LIBERATION: THE PHI-
LosoPHY or REvOLUTION (1955), which I have not seen.
94. Edwin 0. Reischauer writes: "The Asian revolution is in reality our
revolution, fostered, however unconsciously, by the democratic peoples of the
Western world." RECHAUER, WANTED: AN AsrAN PoLicy 207 (1955). For an
account of more or less conscious fostering in Africa, see an article by Emory
Ross, Colonies and World Organization: Non-Governmental Responsibilities and
Stimuli, in FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
APPRAISAL 171 (Bryson, Finkelstein, Lasswell & MacIver ed. 1952). In a com-
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If they get democracy, and not dictatorship of the proletariat, it will
be democracy in terms of indigenous cultural traditions and in the
light of their own problems of population, resources, educational level,
etc. Not our unique results, but our experience in how to go about
solving the problems is what is needed.
The second reason we can help is that we have stability. The almost
poetic insight required to grasp the emerging truth that will guide a
society after the violence of revolution requires a degree of contempla-
tion nearly impossible in a situation of recurrent crisis.
I believe a conscious effort to aid peoples to know themselves and to
gain a sense of political direction is worth making. Objection is made
that this is the sort of thing that comes to a solitary thinker in some
dusty garret. That may be. I can speak from experience about a pre-
liminary try. In my Theory of Constitutional Law course in Taiwan,
I broke down the conceptions of reality held by Democritus, Plato, and
Aristotle into (1) sensed phenomena, (2) order, (3) ultimate reality,
(4) scientific method, (5) categories used to classify experience, and
(6) goal of the system of thought. Then I compared the Greek con-
ceptions of these six elements of reality with corresponding Chinese
conceptions. I also compared early Greek and Chinese answers to the
following chain of questions: What is the source of the animation and
order observed in the sensed world? What is the nature of the anima-
tion and order, and of that which is ordered? Is it one or many? Di-
vided or undivided? These will be recognized, of course, as questions
found in early Greek natural philosophy. I also attempted to correlate
forms of political organization with prevailing views of reality at
various stages in Western civilization. These were rough, one-man
attempts at very big problems; but the intense interest of my students
in finding an answer at this fundamental level convinced me that the
people who must solve these problems-or endure a meaningless exist-
ence-very much want help in solving them.
4. The preceding analysis should enable us to make the distinction
between dictatorships of necessity and dictatorships by intention.
ment on Ross's article (published in the same book at pp. 201-02) Leland S.
Albright writes:
Personally I appreciate both the content and the forthrightness of the
statement. I have been feeling for some time that the plans and program of
UNESCO and of President Truman's Point IV are unconscious and belated
tributes to the unselfish service rendered by Christian missions, philanthropic
foundations, Christian college and service programs and certain govern-
mental agencies in friendly assistance through agricultural and health proj-
ects. It is unfortunate that more has not been done along these lines, and
tragic that the way for such unselfish service is not as open today as for-
merly. It is a case of "Too little and too late" in Asia. Will it be so in Africa
also? Surely there ought to be a greatly augmented program for Africa
while there is still time. Otherwise we may merely prepare more seedbeds
for Communism.
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When the element of a common faith is lacking-as it was in China"
-decentralization of decision-making will result in chaos, not democ-
racy, because no common standard of judgment will make decisions
compatible and actions complementary. As Mr. Sulzberger put it with
respect to Vietnam, "anarchic centrifugal forces would rip the state
apart."9 6 The best that can be hoped for in conditions like those pre-
vailing in Korea, Formosa, and Vietnam, is that the strong personali-
ties who exercise authoritarian government by necessity will also
foster gradual release of authority to the electorate as it becomes re-
sponsible and achieves common purpose.
5. Internationally, we must realize that the "Big Four" can never
bring peace in the world. They are attempting to do so with the factor
of force alone. Before weapons became "absolute," unlimited use of
force by nations maintained, though crudely, an order in the inter-
national community by repelling national claims and demands that
other nations regarded as inimical to their own rights and interests.
But with the development of nuclear weapons, unlimited force can be
expected to produce only death, destruction, and disorder.
The only alternatives to nuclear war are a Communist-dominated
world or a constitutional international community in which ties of
reason, faith, and love exist and in which, because they exist, limited
use of force will be effective to maintain order. With respect to the
rational basis for such an international community, I have elsewhere
suggested that it would be characterized by "international democ-
racy," and have proposed for discussion a nucleus proposition for a
Manifesto of International Democracy.97 I do not believe the world
is ready for federal government, but I believe peace is possible in a
community of free, independent, sovereign nations, based on a respect
for cultural diversity and self-determination. I have also dealt else-
where with the place of Communist nations in such an international
community.9 8 A knowledge of the uses of love in ordering society is
what Asia brings to world councils. The knowledge is invaluable. We
must cease to spurn it and learn to use it. Of course, love alone is not
enough. But clearly, force alone is not enough, either.9"
Perhaps an institute is indicated, in which research would be car-
95. See pp. 273-81, supra; see also C.Y. Hu, CHINA: FROM CULTURAL VACUUM
TO COMMUNISM, a pamphlet published by The Institute for the Study of Chinese
Problems, Hong Kong (1950).
96. See p. 254, supra.
97. Dorsey, The Necessity of Authority to Freedm, in FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY
IN OuR Ti~m 317 (Bryson, Finkelstein, MacIver & McKeon ed. 1953).
98. Dorsey, The State, Communism, and International Law, 1955 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1.
99. Reports from the recent Bandung conference of Asian and African leaders
stressed the emphasis on "moral force" as an instrument of peace. See the dis-
patch filed by Donald Grant from Bandung, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 19,
1955, p. 1c, col. 3.
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ried out in international democracy, Korean democracy, Chinese de-
mocracy, Vietnamese democracy, and so on through the list of in-
terested Asian and African nations, and emerging nations. Cross-
fertilization of experience should in itself be worth the candle. I be-
lieve the candle would become a torch of freedom and peace.
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